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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professor Sherwin is a contrarian and a skeptic.  Surveying the 
doctrine and practice of legal compensation for wrongs—principally 
within tort law—she does not especially like what she sees.1  Defenders 
of the system offer principles that do not readily explain the actual 
practice.  In a variety of ways, she points out, so-called compensation 
often is not really an accurate measure of what is required to make the 
victim whole.  And then she draws a rather startling conclusion.  In 
reality, compensatory “justice” is based partly on revenge, on giving the 
victims of legal wrongs some satisfaction at the expense of their injurers.  
And such revenge is not a virtuous emotion or justification.  So if you 
are a corrective justice maven, she says, don’t be so smug.  You’ve got 
some serious explaining to do.   
This Commentary takes up her challenge.  I will suggest that 
 
 *  M.L. Sykes Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  
 1. See Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 
1388 (2003). 
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nonconsequentialist accounts of tort doctrine have much more explanatory 
power than she suggests and that the supposed fact that many tort 
victims act from vengeful motives has less.  At the same time, her 
revenge interpretation does have value in illuminating some aspects of 
tort doctrine. 
Let us begin with a closer look at Sherwin’s argument.  The first part 
of her paper describes some important discordances between compensation 
practice and the supposed goals of compensation.  Often, she points out, 
actual compensation practice does not properly compensate—either 
because it undercompensates, because it overcompensates, or because it 
purports to compensate for things or conditions that cannot be restored 
or made whole.2 
Undercompensation occurs when losses are excluded because they are 
too unforeseeable or remote, when plaintiffs are precluded from recovering 
the costs of litigation, when wrongful death statutes arbitrarily cap 
recovery, and in other situations.  Overcompensation occurs when damages 
greatly exceed what the victim would voluntarily accept in order to 
suffer the harm (for example, for harm to dignitary interests and for 
violations of civil rights), and when benefits conferred by the injurer are 
not deducted.  (Her examples include the collateral source rule, the 
award of loss of consortium damages even when the spouse of a 
deceased victim remarries, and the policy of not informing the jury that 
the victim’s award is not taxed.)3 
Finally, Sherwin identifies a category of “immeasurable losses,” which 
money cannot replace, and she notes that compensation is nevertheless 
often awarded for such losses—for sensory and emotional harm, pain and 
suffering, harm to reputation, and harm to personal relationships.  
Awarding compensation here is problematic, she suggests.  First, the 
criteria employed are very unscientific: Juries are often merely asked to 
award a “reasonable” sum.  Second, and more fundamentally, the victim 
would accept no amount of money for serious injury or death.4 
What do these multiple discordances suggest?  Although Sherwin 
concedes that policies other than compensation, and pragmatic difficulties, 
explain some of the discrepancies, she believes that not all of them can 
be so rationalized.  Rather, the examples show that compensatory remedies 
are not exclusively devoted to loss adjustment, even in cases where no 
competing goals are evident.  Instead, courts also provide claimants with 
a sense of satisfaction that justice has been done—and “justice” in the 
sense not of corrective justice, but of evening the score.  The basic 
 
 2. Id. at 1389. 
 3. Id. at 1391–92. 
 4. Id. at 1393–94. 
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practice of compensation lets the victim not only regain lost ground, but 
regain it at the injurer’s expense.  Thus, Sherwin thinks, an element of 
revenge must explain tort’s compensation practice. 
Let me suggest three sets of responses to Professor Sherwin’s 
provocative analysis.5 
II.  NONCONSEQUENTIALIST ACCOUNTS OF TORT DOCTRINE ARE      
MORE FECUND THAN SHERWIN SUGGESTS 
Sherwin’s analysis seems to betray a misunderstanding of corrective 
justice and other nonconsequentialist rationales for tort doctrine.  Such 
rationales do not focus exclusively on the victim’s need for compensation.  
Accordingly, it does not follow that some other rationale—revenge—is 
needed to explain the structure of tort law. 
Most corrective justice and other nonconsequentialist tort scholars 
insist on a close linkage between the victim’s right and the injurer’s duty.  
They think that the injurer has an obligation to the victim to restore the 
victim’s position.  To be sure, they sometimes differ sharply about the 
nature of the required linkage.  But there is broad agreement that a linkage 
is required.  It is not enough just to show the social desirability of 
compensating the victim, on the one hand, and the desirability of having 
the injurer pay for the harm he has done, on the other.6  If this were 
enough, we could imagine many different social arrangements other than 
tort law that would serve these purposes, such as government no-fault 
insurance or risk premiums assessed against members of an industry. 
Similarly, Sherwin complains that corrective justice cannot fully 
explain why an injurer must pay the victim for his loss; often, she points 
 
 5. I also believe that tort goals and policies other than compensation, and 
pragmatic and institutional constraints, are more potent than Sherwin suggests in 
explaining the various discordances she describes in her article. 
 6. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 134–35 (1995) 
(arguing that the defendant must have breached a duty correlative to the plaintiff’s right); 
Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 
276 (1996) (discussing this structural feature of corrective justice accounts).  In his 
earlier work, Jules Coleman did suggest that compensation and payment might be 
disconnected and still comport with corrective justice.  See, e.g., Jules Coleman, 
Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 422–27 (1982).  However, 
he has since substantially changed his view.  See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 
365–71 (1992) (describing a “mixed” conception of corrective justice); see also Kenneth 
W. Simons, Jules Coleman and Corrective Justice in Tort Law: A Critique and 
Reformulation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 851–56 (1992) [hereinafter Simons, Jules 
Coleman] (discussing Coleman’s new “mixed” conception of justice). 
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out, the outcome was highly improbable at the time the injurer acted.  
But again, she understates the justificatory power of nonconsequentialist 
tort theory, which indeed can explain why the award of damages for 
harm caused is a just remedy even if the injurer has created only a small, 
but still unjustifiable, risk of harm.7 
Another example of Sherwin’s insufficient appreciation of 
nonconsequentialist principles comes late in the paper.  Having concluded 
that vengeance plays a surprisingly important role in explaining both the 
motivation of litigants and the tort system itself, Sherwin asserts that the 
pursuit of vengeance in this form is more a vice than a virtue.  State- 
recognized retribution (through the criminal law), she concedes, is 
arguably a moral good.  However, the form of revenge that tort litigants 
display is more akin to a private vendetta and is thus at best excusable 
(for example, as a private outlet for emotions).  Why is revenge a more 
legitimate consideration in criminal law than in tort law?  According to 
Sherwin, state retribution focuses on the actor’s absolute desert; by 
contrast, informal revenge is based on personal grievance, on a loss that 
need not be caused by blameworthy conduct, and on a desire for 
comparative mastery over the injurer.8 
Again, however, this analysis understates the resources of corrective 
justice and fairness accounts.  Even if providing the victim with a right 
to recover damages from an injurer is properly described as a form of 
“retaliation,” it is a highly constrained form of retaliation, similar in 
this respect to the criminal law’s punishment of an offender in 
accordance with his just deserts.  Just as criminal law constrains the 
retributive urges, so does tort law by permitting recovery only if the 
victim proves that the injurer violated a standard of care, that this breach 
caused specific types of damages, and so forth.9  (Also, apart from 
punitive damage cases, evidence of the injurer’s wealth is normally 
excluded.)  Why, then, is the legally constrained “retaliation” achieved 
in tort law not also a moral good?10 
 
 7. These reasons include the following: (1) ex ante, it is fair to require the 
defendant to pay for even a small risk of loss, if that risk is unjustifiable, because his 
default will only require payment in a correspondingly small proportion of cases; (2) the 
alternative of requiring compensation for risk creation (whether or not harm results) is 
ordinarily very costly and often infeasible. 
 8. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 1409–11. 
 9. On the other hand, one difference that supports Sherwin’s argument is the 
following: Most criminal law criteria are pretty clearly defined, while the tort standard of 
negligence is relatively open-ended, perhaps permitting jury recourse to “retaliatory” impulses. 
 10. Sherwin does identify a special problem with tort law: The injurer might not 
have committed a moral wrong.  Again, however, she understates the ability of 
nonconsequentialist accounts of tort law to account for strict liability doctrine.  See, e.g., 
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 544–51 
(1972) (offering a “nonreciprocal risk” justification for strict liability); Simons, Jules 
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III.  DO SOME TORT DOCTRINES SUPPORT THE REVENGE 
INTERPRETATION? 
Even if we reject Sherwin’s broader claims about the failure of 
nonconsequentialist accounts to justify tort doctrine and practice, it is 
worth looking more closely at certain doctrines that might lend some 
support to her revenge interpretation.  Consider the law of damages, 
including pain and suffering and hedonic damages. 
With respect to pain and suffering, Sherwin repeats two common 
criticisms: The criteria for measurement are extraordinarily vague, and 
in any event, victims would not accept any amount of money for serious 
injury or death.  Instead, she suggests, variations in pain and suffering 
damages often reflect variations in injurer culpability as much as 
variations in the extent of the loss.11  Indeed, given that these harms are 
immeasurable and irreparable, the award of damages can be viewed as a 
vehicle for the transfer of wealth (and, thereby, status) from wrongdoers 
to victims.  Thus, Sherwin claims, the practice of awarding pain and 
suffering damages supports her retaliation interpretation. 
These last observations are creative and interesting.  However, I believe 
that awards for pain and suffering can, to some extent, be justified on 
more conventional grounds.  Although few victims would accept any 
sum in exchange for serious injury or death, many would (and do) accept 
money or some other benefit in exchange for accepting a risk of injury 
or death.  To be sure, it does not then follow that compensatory justice is 
satisfied by providing damages in the amount of whatever sum a 
particular victim or class of victims would (or did) accept.  Whether this 
is the proper criterion depends on a particularized account of welfare, 
value, or protected human interests.  And the selection of such an 
account in turn depends on the underlying nonconsequentialist theory.12 
Once more, Sherwin seems to assume that corrective justice and other 
fairness-based theories cannot explain whether and how tort law should 
compensate for intangible and irreparable harms.  But any complete 
theory must address such issues.  Relevant distinctions might be drawn 
along numerous dimensions, including: physical, emotional, or 
economic harm; expectation or reliance; harm or loss of a benefit; 
 
Coleman, supra note 6, at 875–81 (suggesting that corrective justice might support two 
strict liability categories: conditional fault and nonfault). 
 11. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 1404. 
 12. For one such account, see generally Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests and 
Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247 (1992). 
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subjective or objective valuation of a loss; and ex ante or ex post 
measures of restoration. 
Consider, for example, the question whether damages should be 
awarded to a comatose person for the loss of sensation or pleasures.  
Should such damages be more or less than the damages owed to a 
conscious person who is aware of her loss of the same sensations or 
pleasures?  On the one hand, the latter at least possesses consciousness.  
On the other, she is also aware of her loss, as the former is not.13  Only 
an account of the kinds of interests that the law should protect can 
answer such questions.  An appeal to the revenge interpretation is not 
illuminating here. 
However, Sherwin is more persuasive when she turns to punitive 
damages.  She plausibly argues that the availability of such damages is 
better explained as serving the victim’s interest in imposing private 
punishment than as improving deterrence.14  Indeed, she might emphasize 
that an award of punitive damages requires some aggravated form of 
fault, such as recklessness or willful conduct.  This requirement supports 
her general thesis: Additional damages are permitted in just those cases 
where the retaliatory impulse is understandably the strongest. 
Moreover, the revenge interpretation sheds more light on another 
doctrine that Sherwin mentions only in passing—hedonic damages.  
Corrective justice has some difficulty justifying the award of damages 
for the lost pleasures of living in cases where the victim dies and is not 
survived by family members.  In such a case, who deserves compensation?  
And similarly, even when the victim leaves survivors, do they deserve as 
an element of damages his lost pleasures of living, over and above their 
own personal economic and emotional losses?  Practical and standing 
difficulties partly explain this lacuna in the law of damages.  And some 
fairness-based theorists might try to affirmatively justify noncompensation 
here (though this raises the usual objection against permitting an injurer 
to be better off for killing a victim than for seriously injuring her).  But 
perhaps the retaliation interpretation is also a partial explanation for 
nonrecovery for such hedonic damages.  After all, the retributive sentiment 
will normally be weaker when the immediate victim is not even 
conscious of her loss. 
Finally, Sherwin aptly observes that the current compensation system 
supports individual suits by victims against injurers but does not endorse 
recovery from a risk pool (into which all tortious potential injurers have 
 
 13. Courts are split on this question.  See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1052 
(2000) (collecting cases). 
 14. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 1402. 
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contributed).15  Of course, high administrative costs would make the latter 
approach impractical in all but a few cases.  Still, she is correct that her 
revenge interpretation supports the tort law’s endorsement of the 
traditional approach, which provides the victim with a sense of satisfaction 
from pursuing the actual injurer.  Whatever arguments of fairness one might 
offer for the pooling approach,16 victims are less likely to feel personally 
vindicated under that approach.  Another illustration of Sherwin’s point is the 
states’ experiences with no-fault automobile legislation.  Notwithstanding 
the high hopes of no-fault advocates, the public seems to care a great 
deal about retaining the fault system in all but the most minor accidents, 
even at the expense of significantly higher insurance premiums.17 
IV.  THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LITIGATION 
Sherwin’s revenge interpretation also includes a phenomenological 
claim about the motives of legal actors seeking compensation.  
Corrective justice, she asserts, cannot explain the aggressive sentiments 
often accompanying claims to compensation.  Victims do not just want 
to recover for losses; they wish to “prevail over their injurers.”  (Indeed, 
with a melodramatic flourish, she suggests that victims “stalk” their 
injurers.)18 
This phenomenological claim is intriguing but inadequately developed.  
In the first place, it is ambiguous.  Is it a claim about the reasons why 
victims participate in the system?  About the tangible or intangible 
benefits they expect to obtain at the end?  More empirical support would 
be helpful here. 
Moreover, if this is a factual claim, the obvious next question is why, 
or even whether, these facts matter.  Why should we care why litigants 
use the legal system?  And why should we expect corrective justice (or 
any other justificatory theory) to “explain” the phenomenology of litigation?  
More needs to be said here.  If our tort system is adequately justified by 
 
 15. Id. at 1400–01. 
 16. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing 
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 460–69 (1990) (arguing that corrective justice supports 
such a risk pool); Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-
Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113, 118–20 (1990) (agreeing in part). 
 17. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 242–48 
(2d ed. 2002) (noting that legislatures have been reluctant to abolish tort liability for 
automobile accidents entirely).  Plaintiffs’ tort lawyers no doubt have also discouraged 
the development of no-fault systems. 
 18. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 1397. 
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principles of efficiency, or corrective justice, or transactional or 
distributive justice, should it matter that litigants have their own distinct 
motives for using the system, even if the motives seem to be in tension 
with those principles? 
On the other hand, it is indeed plausible to believe that the underlying 
justifications for the legal system should pay some heed to the 
motivation of actors who use the system.  The necessity of some such 
connection is most clear under an efficiency theory.  For if the tort system is 
to give injurers appropriate incentives to take due care, then it is relevant 
whether and how often victims use the legal system.19  Also, insofar as 
the efficient state of affairs being sought assumes a utilitarian calculus 
that counts the satisfaction of the preferences of participants, the 
satisfaction of the victims’ desire for revenge has positive social value. 
It is less clear how nonconsequentialist theories take into account the 
motives of victim litigants (vengeful or otherwise).  At the very least, 
such theories must be perceived as legitimate, but this alone imposes 
only a very weak constraint on the content of the principles.  Almost 
any coherent approach to compensation satisfies this criterion, even if 
the approach does little or nothing to satisfy the supposed preferences 
of victims for revenge. 
However, there is another way to understand Sherwin’s emphasis on 
the phenomenology of litigation.  The “prevailing over the injurer” story 
might be an account of how the legal system—or at least an important 
part of the legal system—understands itself.  The jury plays a vital role 
in tort cases.  And it is possible that the arguments that really matter to 
jurors are those based on revenge, rather than corrective justice (insofar 
as these genuinely differ).  Some support for this view can be found in 
Neal Feigenson’s recent book.20  Reviewing the literature on jury 
decisionmaking in tort cases, Feigenson suggests that juries very often 
try to do “total justice.”  That is, they “strive to square all accounts 
between the parties [and] reach a decision that is correct as a whole,” 
sometimes in disregard of the technical legal standards.21  And revenge, 
or something closely akin to it, often plays a vital role.  “[P]eople tend to 
conceive of accidents as melodramas and the doing of justice as the 
righting of an imbalance (or the distribution of accident costs) between 
the good guy(s) and the bad guy(s).”22  Also, insofar as negligence 
 
 19. Of course, whether vengeful motives actually do promote efficiency depends 
on whether they encourage victims to sue at an optimal rate or instead too often (or too 
infrequently). 
 20. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT 
ACCIDENTS (2000). 
 21. Id. at 5. 
 22. Id. at 13. 
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doctrine itself often relies heavily on the judgment of an individual jury 
about what constitutes “reasonable care,” rather than on a preexisting 
judicial or legislative criterion, juries are relatively free to rely on 
retributive sentiments in deciding whether the injurer has acted 
tortiously. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Sherwin’s mischievous claim, that compensatory remedies 
actually rest in part on vengeance, will strike some readers as hyperbolic 
or even absurd.  Torts are not crimes.  And compensation is not 
punishment. 
But Sherwin succeeds in demonstrating some complexities and 
contradictions in the legal institution of remedial compensation.  Although 
she underestimates the power of nonconsequentialist principles to 
explain and justify that institution, and is too quick to assume that the 
vengeful motives of some litigants bear on such an explanation or 
justification, her unorthodox excavation does reveal trace elements of 
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